The paper, by incorporating the latest developments on the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement, (Bădin et al., 2012) investigates in a dynamic context the effect of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus and salary payments on banks' technical efficiency levels. We apply time-dependent conditional efficiency estimates to analyze a sample of 37 US banks for the period from 2003 to 2012. The empirical evidence reveals a non-linear relationship between CEO bonus and salary payments and banks' efficiency levels. More specifically it is reported that salary and bonus payments affect differently banks' technological change and technological catch-up levels. Finally, the empirical evidence suggests that higher salary and bonus payments are not always aligned with higher technical efficiency levels.
Introduction
Over the past decades several influential papers 1 have explored empirically the link between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation levels and firms' performance (known as pay-for-performance relationship). These studies examine the pay-forperformance relationship mainly for industrial US firms. They explored how firms' performance 2 determines CEO compensation levels. The majority of the empirical evidence suggest that the relationship is positive, 3 however, there are also a few studies providing evidence of a weak relationship (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Zhou, 2000; Buck et al., 2003) . On the other hand, some other studies report that there is even a negative relationship between excess CEO compensation and firms' performance (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006) . Arguments in the literature (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Hambrick and Quigley, 2014) suggest that when managerial discretion 4 and CEO compensation are aligned then firm performance should be higher. Furthermore, earlier studies suggest that cash compensation should be structured in such a way that will enable high rewards to be associated with high performance Murphy, 1990a, 1990b; Mehran, 1995; Hall and Leibman, 1997) .
Despite the importance of such a relationship in the banking industry, surprisingly a few empirical studies have been exploring the link between CEO compensation and bank performance. This study contributes to current empirical 1 See, for example, Ciscel and Carroll (1980) , Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Murphy (1985) , Jensen and Murphy (1990a,b) , Kaplan (1994) , Mehran (1995) , Hall and Leibman (1997) , Finkelstein and Boynd (1998) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a,b) . 2 The extant research uses stock prices and financial and accounting based ratios as a measure of firms' performance. 3 For an extensive literature review see Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003) . 4 Managerial discretion is the ability of a CEO (or a top manager) to make strategic decisions that have both direct and indirect impact on firms' performance (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) research on CEO compensation in general and banking in particular. The paper differs from other recent studies in several ways.
Firstly, we explore for the first time the effect of CEO bonus and salary payments on banks' efficiency levels. We use a sample of 37 US bank holding companies over the period from 2003 to 2012. We examine in a nonparametric context the CEO payment-bank performance relationship. Secondly, we apply the latest developments of data envelopment analysis (DEA), 5 as have been introduced by Bădin et al. (2012) and Mastromarco and Simar (2014) . Specifically, we model bank technical efficiency by taking into consideration time effects and the effects imposed by CEO compensation levels without imposing the restrictive separability assumption. 6 This is done by treating time and CEO compensation levels as external/environmental factors which in turn influence banks' production process. A number of recent studies, e.g. Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, 2008; Hayes and Shaefer, 2009; Bizjak, Lemmon and Nguyen, 2011 ; among others, provide empirical support for the view that there is a common practice of competitive benchmarking to determine CEO compensation. Bizjak et al. (2008) point out that the practice is questionable since it can increase executive pay without taking into account a firm's performance. On the other hand, competitive benchmarking can be used as an efficient tool to retain valuable CEOs. In other words, CEO compensation is not necessarily determined by the firm itself but reflects compensation packages across the sector 7 .
Moreover, we apply full and partial time-dependent conditional efficiency measures that enable us to explore separately the effect of time and CEO bonus and 5 Recently Chen et al. (2013) have illustrated the usefulness of DEA methodology for the top management level due its ability to measure firms' performance by identifying the firms' imposing competitive advantage. 6 For details see the studies by Wilson (2007, 2011 technical efficiency estimates instead of financial and accounting based ratios that are commonly used. Such an approach circumvents all the disadvantages related to those performance measures. The advantages of using relative rather than absolute measures for the analysis of the pay-for-performance relationship are discussed in detail by Antle and Smith (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990). Steigenberger (2014) then discusses the limitation of financial and accounting ratios as a measure of firms'
performance. Fourthly, our model does not impose any assumptions related to the functional form of the examined relationship that allows us to reveal any nonlinearities.
This is an important contribution to current research in the banking industry. The previous studies have assumed a linear relationship between CEO remuneration and bank performance.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature of the pay-for-performance relationship with a particular emphasis on the banking sector. Section 3 provides a description of the variables used and presents the proposed methodological framework. Finally, Section 4 discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 provides a summary of our findings.
Review of the literature
The prevailing empirical research on the CEO compensation-firm performance relationship has mostly been conducted for industrial firms. 9 Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , for example, examine how the changes in compensation affect stock price 8 See, for example, Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2005) . 9 This was mainly related to data availability issues.
performance. They provide supporting evidence that compensation affects both firms' stock price and sales growth levels. Murphy (1985) analyzes the same relationship by adopting, as a dependent variable, the compensation level and as an independent variable, shareholder returns (rather than accounting profits) and growth of firms sales on the sample of 500 executives from the 73 largest manufacturing companies over the period from 1964 to 1981. The study shows that the performance measures that were adopted are strongly related to CEO compensation. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) also argue that CEOs' financial rewards affect directly firms' performance levels. They conclude that CEOs' remuneration incentives are very important determinants of firms' performance levels. In addition, they provide evidence that CEOs' performance incentives come from stock ownership. Jensen and Murphy (1990b) then emphasise that cash compensation should be structured in such a way that enables high rewards to be associated with high performance. There is, however, evidence that cash compensation and corporate performance are weakly interrelated. Thus, it means that the 'efficient' structure of cash compensation should reflect upon firms' performance levels. In the same spirit, Kaplan (1994) They find that prior firm performance is not linked to CEO compensation but firm size is a key determinant. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) show that relative performance evaluations are not linked with CEOs compensation contracts. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) provide convincing evidence that there is a link between sensitivity of compensation with the performance of rival firms. They also suggest that relative performance evaluation is very important for our understanding of executive compensation.
On the other hand, there are a number of studies that confirm the relationship between CEO rewards and firms' performance. Brunello et al. (2001) , who use a sample of 107 Italian firms, point out the positive relationship between CEO compensation and firms' profit levels. Mitsudome et al. (2008) compare Japanese and US companies and their results indicate that there is a significantly positive relationship between CEO compensation and short-term performance. However, they could not confirm such a relationship for the Japanese firms when they use sales growth levels as a proxy for firm performance. Barro and Barro's (1990) study was among the first studies to investigate payfor-performance contracts in the banking industry. They explore the relationship using a sample that includes US commercial banks during the period from 1982 to 1987. They find that the growth of compensation is positively related to accounting earnings and stock returns. That means the compensation growth depends on relative and aggregate performance. Later Hubbard and Palia (1995) provide evidence of a stronger relationship of compensation-performance during the 1980s, i.e., the period of interstate banking permission. They show that bank size also determines the level of compensation. Crawford et al. (1995) examined the sensitivity of CEO performance after the deregulation period for a sample of 37 commercial banks over the period from 1976 to 1982. They provide evidence that during the deregulation period there was an increase in pay-performance sensitivities. Houston and James (1995) The above brief review of the literature indicates that there are some pay-forperformance studies that explore how banks' performance determines CEO compensation levels. However, we find a gap in current research that analyses how CEO compensation affects bank performance. Furthermore, it is also evident that the relative literature applies mostly the parametric approaches to investigate the pay-forperformance relationship. In other words, the model assumes a linear relationship between bank performance and CEO compensation. To this end our paper contributes to the literature by incorporating into our analysis a fully non-parametric framework enabling us to reveal any non-linear links. This can be accomplished by applying the latest developments of the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement which are presented in the next section.
Data and methodology

Description of variables
We collect data for CEO compensation from (2013) and Kaplan (2012)). These provisions include: i)
Advisory votes of shareholders about executive compensation and golden parachutes, including specific disclosure of golden parachutes in merger proxies; ii) disclosure about the role of, and potential conflicts involving, compensation consultants; iii) additional disclosure about certain compensation matters, including pay-forperformance and the ratio between the CEO's total compensation and the median total compensation for all other company employees; iv) the Commission to direct the exchanges to prohibit the listing of securities of issuers that have not developed and implemented compensation claw-back policies; and v) a disclosure about whether directors and employees are permitted to hedge any decrease in market value of the company's stock.
All those changes have been gradually implemented by the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). In the period from 2010-2012, the SEC implemented the rules that require institutional investment managers to report their votes on executive compensation and "golden parachute" arrangements. The SEC also adopted rules concerning shareholder approval of executive compensation and "golden parachute" compensation arrangements. Finally in July 2012, the SEC adopted rules regarding the disclosure about the role of, and potential conflicts involving, compensation consultants. In 2013, the SEC then adopted rules regarding pay ratios. In 2015, the Commission proposed rules regarding disclosure about whether directors and employees are permitted to hedge any decrease in market value of the company's stock and finally the Commission proposed rules regarding pay for performance disclosure.
It is evident that these rules do not impose any significant restrictions on CEO compensation but require disclosure of information about CEO compenstation. In other words, our sample that covers the period from 2003-2012 is not biased due to the systematic changes in CEO remuneration. The main changes were introduced after 2012 that includes also pay performance related compensation disclosure.
We select financial institutions with Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6300. We then exclude manually financial institutions with CEO compensation into several categories. In our analysis, we use for CEO payment the total current compensation values that are directly extracted from the database and include salary and bonuses. As for financial statement data, these data are obtained from Bankscope, which is the most widely used database for financial institutions. We collected defined variables from consolidated financial statements for bank holding companies.
Furthermore, for our DEA context we need to specify banks' production function. Hugh and Mester (2008) argue that bank production is unique to the production of other types of lenders. They show that banks have a special capital structure, i.e. the bank production process is based on the intermediation of deposits into informationally opaque assets. This argument is further supported by Berlin and Mester (2000), who provide empirical evidence of an explicit link between banks' liability structure and banks' lending behaviour. Such findings correspond with the role of banks in the economic system. Banks can reduce the problem of asymmetric information that is reflected consequently by reducing bank risk during its production process. Hugh and Mester (2008) further argue that this leads to efficient and prudent production of financial services.
Thus we apply the intermediation approach as proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and has been followed by empirical research on bank efficiency, (eg. Curi, Lozano-Vivas, Zelenyuk, 2015; Fujii et al., 2014; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010; Hugh and Mester , 1998) Under the intermediation approach the inputs used are property, plant and equipment (a proxy for bank capital), deposits and number of employees. Bank outputs are defined as securities and loans. Furthermore, we use CEO salary and bonus payments in our model. Tables 1 & 2 present analytically (per year and per bank) the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis.
[ Table 1 and 
According to Simar (2005, 2007a ) the production set can also be characterized as:
Therefore, the production process can be described by the joint probability of
Then the Farrell-Debreu measure of input oriented efficiency can also be characterized as:
Mastromarco and Simar (2014) introduce, for the first time, the time-dependent conditional efficiency measures based on the probabilistic approach by Simar (2005, 2007a ) and the latest developments by Bădin et al. (2012) . Similarly, let the time T be an additional conditional variable with those examined in our case (bonus and salary payments). Then for each time period t the attainable set 
where
and
Then the full frontier case input oriented technical efficiency of a bank
xy , at time t facing the conditions z can be defined as:
For the full frontier estimation we have used the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS). This assumption is commonly used in banking efficiency literature by incorporating directly banks' scale effects. However, it must be noted that there is also support from several authors for the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption (Kumar and Russell, 2002; Henderson and Russell, 2005; Henderson and Zelenyuk, 2007;  Mastromarco and since it can provide us with a greater discriminative power compared to the VRS assumption (Zelenyuk and Zheka, 2006) .
Furthermore, the order-α quantile efficiency measure (also called robust or partial frontiers) for the input oriented case as introduced by Daouia and Simar (2007) can be defined for
Therefore, the order-α quantile efficiency measure of a bank   , z t xy , at time t facing the conditions z can be defined as:
For the partial frontiers (conditional and unconditional) we have used 0.5   which according to Bădin et al. (2012) 
We also have to note that Finally, in order to examine the effect of time and CEO salary and bonus payments on banks' performance levels, we adopt the approach introduced by Bădin et 11 Bădin et al. (2010) describe in detail the procedure and provide the Matlab codes for the calculation of optimal bandwidth h (also called smoothing parameter).
al. (2012) by creating the ratios of conditional to unconditional efficiency estimates from the full and partial frontier measures: (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2005) , banks' technological changes is represented by the 'shifts in banks' production frontier' whereas banks' technological catch-up are represented by the 'movements toward or away from their production frontier'.
We apply a local linear estimator and optimal bandwidths using the least Tables 1 and 2 provide a basic information about our sample. As we can see there are large differences within time periods which indicate the presence of potential outliers and dimensionality problems that can significantly distort the precision of our estimates. Therefore we have to reduce the dimension in the input-output space and thus to gain precision and reliability in our analysis. As proposed by Bădin et al. (2012) and Daraio et al. (2015) , we apply a variable reduction procedure and we replace the inputs and outputs by their best (non-centered) linear combinations (see for details Daraio and Simar, 2007b, pp. 148-150) . As a result of that, we reduce the problem of dimensionality without losing any information, since the resulting univariate input (IF) and output (OF) factors are highly correlated with the original inputs and outputs used.
Empirical findings
The results from the input/output reduction are: Following the methodology described previously, Table 3 [ Table 3 about here] In both cases, the results emphasize the negative effect of the global financial crisis on bank performance levels.
[ Figure technological change (sub-figure 2a), we observe that for lower CEO salary levels the effect is negative. On the other hand, for higher salary values, we observe that the effect is positive.
If we examine the effect of CEO bonuses and time on banks' technological change (sub-figure 2b), we observe a different effect. For lower bonus levels the effect is positive that is represented as a decreasing nonparametric regression line, up to a certain bonus level. However, as we move towards the end of the period the effect from neutral turns to negative, which is indicated by an increasing nonparametric line.
Furthermore, when we examine the dynamic effect of CEO salary and bonus levels on banks' technological catch-up (subfigures 2c and 2d), we observe a similar behaviour. As we have already mentioned, we set 0.5   in order to observe the effect of time, bonus and salary payments on the middle of the distribution of banks' efficiencies. Our 3-dimensional picture reveals that for lower salary levels the effect is negative -an increasing nonparametric line. We observe that after a certain threshold salary level the effect becomes then positive, a decreasing nonparametric line. When we examine the behaviour of salary on banks' efficiency levels, we observe that as we move towards and away from the global financial crisis period, the effect described previously becomes more emphatic. Similarly, when we examine the effect of bonus on banks' distribution of efficiencies again we observe that for small levels of bonus payments the effect on banks' efficiency levels is positive but for higher bonuses the effect becomes negative. When we move towards the end of the period this effect becomes more pronounced.
The 3-dimensional pictures 2e and 2f provide us with the same information of the effect of bonuses and payments on banks' technological change as in sub-figures 2a and 2b. However, as has been suggested by Bădin et al. (2012) when we apply the
Order-α frontiers and we set  near to 1 (in our case 0.95
), then we can have a robust visualization of the examined effects since in some cases some extreme data points can mask over some effect of bonus, salaries and time. If we compare our four 3-dimensional pictures (i.e. 2a with 2e and 2b with 2f), we can observe differences in the effect on banks' technological change levels. These differences are attributed to the extreme data points. Specifically, when we examine the effect of salary and time on banks' technological change levels (sub-figure 2e), we observe that for lower salary levels the effect is negative up to a certain salary level. After that level, and for the largest part of salary levels, the effect becomes positive. Furthermore, when we compare the 3-dimensional picture from the partial frontier in subfigure 2e with the one for the full frontier (subfigure 2a), we can conclude that the effect of salary on banks' technological change is the same throughout the examined period and does not change.
Thus it is evident that extreme data point can mask over the examined effect and therefore the need to apply robust frontiers with  values near to 1 proven to be essential for our case. In the same way subfigure 2f presents the effect of bonus payment and time on countries' technological change levels using robust frontiers. In contrast to subfigure 2b, the 3-dimensional picture presented on subfigure 2f provides us with a robust view of the effect avoiding the influence of extreme data points. The results reveal a clear positive effect on banks' technological change levels for lower levels of bonus payments, however, for larger levels of bonus payments the effect become negative. It is also evident that this effect is observed throughout the entire period.
However, this was not the case when we examine the same effect under the full frontiers (subfigure 2b), suggesting that the extreme data points mask over the examined effect.
The overall results suggest that higher levels of CEO salaries affect positively banks' technological change and technological catch-up, whereas higher levels of CEO bonuses affect them negatively. According to Crawford et al. (1995) the deregulation of banks provides the framework for riskier investments. In our setting risk-taking involves the over-investment in risky loans and securities (Kupiec and O'Brien, 1997).
As a result shareholders use performance-pay schemes to encourage risk-taking by
CEOs. The positive correlation between CEO compensation and corporate risk is well documented in the relative literature (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Gormley et al., 2013) , 16 this in turn justifies our findings regarding the negative effect of higher levels of CEO bonus payments. Since the CEO bonus payments are associated with risk investments, this in turn reflects negatively on banks' technological change and technological catch-up levels. On the other hand, since technological change investments are regarded as a source of systematic risk (Papanikolaou, 2008) , the positive effect of higher levels of CEO salary payments on banks' technology change and technological catch-up can be attributed to the positive correlation between riskier investments and CEO incentives.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Conclusions
In our study, we apply an innovative methodological framework to explore the effect of CEO salary and bonus payments on banks' efficiency levels. We find that the effect of CEO cash compensation on bank performance has a nonlinear form. These results challenge the findings presented by studies that apply the traditional pay-forperformance relationship investigated in a parametric setup, eg. Ang et al., 2002; John and Qian, 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2009 ; among other studies that assume ex-ante a linear relation. We also argue that higher CEO compensation levels do not necessarily improve bank efficiency. Our results indicate that CEO salary and bonus payments affect differently bank technological change and technological catch-up levels. We show that lower salaries have a negative effect on bank technological change and technological catch-up levels. That means CEOs have to be paid above a certain threshold level in order to affect bank performance positively. We also show that higher bonuses as a performance related part of the total CEO remuneration package do not have the expected effect on bank technological change and technological catch-up levels. These results correspond to previous research studies that explore the CEO payment incentives and risk investments, eg. Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Gormley et al., 2013 ; among others. Riskier investments have a negative effect on bank efficiency levels (Brissimis et al., 2008) , and therefore CEO payment incentives that are interrelated with such investments (loans and securities) also have a negative effect. This is supported by our empirical findings that indicate that higher levels of CEO bonus payments can lead to risk taking involving the overinvestment in risky loans and securities (Kupiec and O'Brien, 1997) . This consequently negatively affects bank technological change and technological catch-up levels.
A logical extension of this study might be to further explore the effect of time and CEO compensation on bank performance levels in other geographical locations, and in particular in Europe. In terms of methodological framework it would be worth investigating the probabilistic characterization of directional distance functions, as proposed by Simar and Vanhems, 2012 and the new developments involved in the conditional directional distances, as discussed by Daraio and Simar, 2014 . However, the proposed research extensions are beyond the scope of our paper and are left for 
